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Cisco Catalyst Memory Leak Vulnerability
Revision 1.0
For Release 2000 December 6 08:00 AM US/Pacific (UTC+0700)
_________________________________________________________________
Summary
A series of failed telnet authentication attempts to the switch can cause
the Catalyst Switch to fail to pass traffic or accept management
connections until the system is rebooted or a power cycle is performed. All
types of telnet authentication are affected, including Kerberized telnet,
and AAA authentication.
This vulnerability has been assigned Cisco bug ID CSCds66191.
The complete advisory can be viewed at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/catalyst-memleak-pub.shtml.
Affected Products
Catalyst 4000 and 5000 images running version 4.5(2) up to 5.5(4) and
5.5(4a).
Catalyst 6000 images running version 5.3(1)CSX, up to and including 5.5(4),
5.5(4a).
No other releases of Cisco Catalyst software are affected by this
vulnerability.
No other Cisco products are affected by this vulnerability.
Details
The telnet process fails to release resources upon a failed authentication,
or a successful login of extremely short duration such as a telnet from
within an automated script. This memory leak eventually results in the
failure of the switch to perform any other processes, such as forwarding
traffic or management; a power cycle or reboot is required for recovery.
The command "show process memory" will indicate increased "Holding" memory
after failed telnet authentication attempts. This value will not decrease
over time except when a reboot, reload, or power cycle occurs. This bug may
be triggered over a period of time in the course of normal operation by
legitimate users that occasionally fail authentication.
lt-6509-e> (enable) sh proc mem
Memory Used: 3974544
Free: 15265168
Total: 19239712
PID TTY Allocated Freed Holding Process
- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------------
1 -2 1707632 3488 1704144 Kernel and Idle
24 -2 16 0 16 telnetd
Impact
This vulnerability enables a Denial of Service attack on the Catalyst
switch.
Software Versions and Fixes
Cisco has made the following fixed software available to customers:
Catalyst Release 4.5(10) for Catalyst 4000 and 5000.
Catalyst Release 5.5(4b) for Catalyst 4000, 5000 and 6000.
The fix will be carried forward into all future releases.
Getting Fixed Software
Cisco is offering free software upgrades to remedy this vulnerability for
all affected customers.
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web
site at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers without contracts should get their upgrades by contacting the
Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows:
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll-free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free
upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through
the TAC. Please do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or
"security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades.
Workarounds
There is no configuration workaround to eliminate the problem. However, if
you are unable to upgrade to an unaffected version, you may use other
devices to strictly control or prohibit telnet access to the switch,
permitting only connections from your local network.
Access control lists on the switch can limit the remote exploitation of the
vulnerability. To limit access to known hosts use the following commands:
set ip permit enable telnet
set ip permit <addr> [mask]
Remote management of the switch can also be disabled.
The above workarounds are provided as an option; however, the
recommendation is to upgrade to fixed code as soon as possible.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Cisco Systems knows of no public discussion nor active exploits involving
this vulnerability, which was reported by a customer who noted the memory
leak.
Status of This Notice: FINAL
This is a final field notice. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy
of all statements in this notice, all of the facts have been checked to the
best of our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of
this notice unless there is some material change in the facts. Should there
be a significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this notice.
Distribution
This notice will be posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/catalyst-memleak-pub.shtml. In
addition to Worldwide Web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients:
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* first-teams@first.org (includes CERT/CC)
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco
* Various internal Cisco mailing lists
Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's Worldwide
Web server, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
URL given above for any updates.
Revision History
Revision 1.006-DEC-2000 Initial public release.
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's Worldwide
Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This
includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices.
_________________________________________________________________
This notice is copyright 2000 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, including
all date and version information.
_________________________________________________________________
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