While many things about the next generation architecture are yet in
the fogs of the future, it does seem that more information hiding
will take place and less global information will propagate among
"federations" or whatever we call domains.
We have mentioned operational requirements insofar as they seem to
impact protocol operation. I suggest that there may be at least two
additional areas that are not part of the "routing architecture," but
will have to be there to make things work. They are apt to be at the
application layer, but might propagate through special channels.
The first is the trusted distribution of policy, which to some extent
has been discussed.
The second, which I have not seen mentioned, could be called
operational coordination or incident communications. It deals with
how we may have to troubleshoot with less global information than we
now have. Are there requirements for standards for failure
notification to NOCs--even to _finding_ NOCs? Will the deployment
need Best Current Practices for cooperative troubleshooting?
Does robustness need a way to quarantine domains that are causing
global problems (e.g., AS 7007)? Obviously, if misused, this could
be a form of DoS or of political censorship.
Food for thought.
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