[c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco TelePresence System Integrator C Series and Cisco TelePresence EX Series Device Default Root Account Manufacturing Error

Wed Nov 9 11:00:00 EST 2011

Software that runs on Cisco TelePresence System Integrator C Series
and Cisco TelePresence EX Series devices was updated to include secure
default configurations beginning with the TC4.0 release. This change
was accompanied by the release of Cisco Security Advisory
cisco-sa-20110202-tandberg.

Due to a manufacturing error, Cisco TelePresence System Integrator C
Series and Cisco TelePresence EX Series devices that were distributed
between November 18th, 2010 and September 19th, 2011 may have the root
account enabled.

Information on how to identify affected devices is available in the
Details section of this advisory.

Information on how to remediate this issue is available in the
Workarounds section of this advisory.

This advisory is posted at:
 http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20111109-telepresence-c-ex-series

Affected Products
=================

The following products are only affected if they were distributed
between November 18th, 2010 and September 19th, 2011 with software
release TC4.0, TC4.1, or TC4.2.

Vulnerable Products
+------------------

All Cisco TelePresence System Integrator C Series, Cisco TelePresence
EX Series, and Cisco TelePresence Quick Set products that were
distributed within the designated timeframe are potentially affected.
Administrators can determine the status of their device by using the
Serial Number Validator located at the following link:
http://serialnumbervalidation.com/PSIRT-20111026

The Serial Number Validator tool will indicate if the device was
affected when the product was shipped. If a factory reset or software
upgrade occurred or certain manual configuration changes were made,
the device may not be affected. 

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------

Cisco TelePresence System Integrator C Series and Cisco TelePresence
EX Series devices that were distributed prior to November 18th, 2010
or after September 19th, 2011 are not affected by this vulnerability.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected.

Details
=======

Cisco TelePresence System Integrator C Series and Cisco TelePresence
EX Series devices bring an immersive, interactive, and engaging
experience to person-to-person or group telepresence calls.

Default Root Account
+-------------------

As the result of an error that occurred during the manufacturing and
distribution process, affected products may have been distributed with
an insecure configuration. The vulnerability is due to a failure to
return devices to default configurations after license/option
configuration and testing.

Affected devices may have the root account enabled and configured with
a well-known default password. This account is intended to be enabled
by device administrators when certain debugging actions need to be
performed and should be disabled by default.

Administrators may verify the configuration of affected devices by
using one of the following methods:

For devices that are running TC4.0 or 4.1 software, administrators may
view the serial number of an affected device by logging in to the
command line of an affected device with the admin account and issuing
the xstatus systemunit hardware command.

View Serial Number:
+------------------

    ssh admin at 203.113.55

    Welcome to TANDBERG Codec Release TC4.1.0.247017 SW Release
    Date: 2011-01-28

    OK

    systemtools xstatus producttype
    *s SystemUnit Hardware Module SerialNumber: "ABC123456789"
    *s SystemUnit Hardware Module Identifier: "05"
    *s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard SerialNumber: "ABC123456"
    *s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard Identifier: "101551-3 [05]"
    *s SystemUnit Hardware BootSoftware: "U-Boot 2010.06-81"
    ** end

Determining the State of the Root Account:
+-----------------------------------------

As the result of a functional defect that was introduced in software
release TC4.0, the systemtools rootsettings get command will always
return a value of off. To accurately determine the state of the root
account on devices that are running software release TC4.0 or TC4.1,
administrators should attempt to open an SSH connection to an affected
device as root.

Root Account Enabled:
+---------------------

    ssh root at 203.0.113.55

    [tandberg:~] $

Root Account Disabled:

    ssh root at 203.0.113.55

    Password:
    Password:
    Password:

    Permission denied (publickey,keyboard-interactive)

For devices that are running software release TC4.2, administrators
can view the serial number or status of the root account by logging in
to the command line of an affected device with the admin account and
issuing one of the following commands:

View Serial Number:
+------------------

    ssh admin at 203.0.113.55

    Welcome to
    TANDBERG Codec Release TC4.2.0.260857
    SW Release Date: 2011-07-11

    OK

    systemtools xstatus producttype
    *s SystemUnit Hardware Module SerialNumber: "ABC123456789"
    *s SystemUnit Hardware Module Identifier: "05"
    *s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard SerialNumber: "ABC123456"
    *s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard Identifier: "101551-3 [05]"
    *s SystemUnit Hardware BootSoftware: "U-Boot 2010.06-81"
    ** end

    OK

View Root Account Status:
+------------------------

Administrators can issue the systemtools rootsettings get command to
retrieve the current status of the root account. The command will
return one of the following values:

  * off  (indicates the root user is disabled)
  * never (indicates the root user is permanently disabled)
  * serial [password] (indicates the root user is available on the
    serial port only)
  * on [password] (indicates the root user is available on all ports)

    ssh admin at 203.0.113.55

    Welcome to TANDBERG Codec Release TC4.1.0.247017 SW Release
    Date: 2011-01-28

    OK

    systemtools rootsettings get
    off
    OK

If the command returns off or never, the root account is disabled, and
the device is not affected.

Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================

No CVSS score has been provided for this vulnerability because it was
introduced due to a process error and not a fault in the software that
runs on affected devices.

Impact
======

The vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to take complete
control of an affected device. This access may include modifying the
configuration or security of the device and could allow the attacker
to load arbitrary software on an affected unit.

Software Versions and Fixes
===========================

When considering software upgrades, also consult:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt

As well as any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a
complete upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.

Workarounds
===========

This vulnerability can be remediated by taking one of the following
actions:

  * Administrators can manually disable the root account by issuing
    the systemtools rootsettings [off|never] command on the admin
    command-line interface.
  * Administrators can reset an affected device to the factory
    defaults.

Disable Root User:
+-----------------

    ssh admin at 203.0.113.55

    Welcome to
    TANDBERG Codec Release TC4.2.0.260857
    SW Release Date: 2011-07-11

    OK

    systemtools rootsettings off

    OK
    Connection to 203.0.113.55 closed by remote host.

Resetting a device to factory defaults will result in the following:
+-------------------------------------------------------------------

  * Factory default passwords
  * Factory default configurations, including Session Initiation
    Protocol (SIP) and H.323 settings
  * Local phonebook
  * All logs
  * DHCP information

The software release and any options keys that are installed on a
device will remain.

Administrators can use the following procedure to perform a factory
reset:

Command Line Factory Reset (C20, C40, C60, C90, EX60, and EX90
Codecs):

    ssh admin at 203.0.113.55

    Welcome to
    TANDBERG Codec Release TC4.2.0.260857
    SW Release Date: 2011-07-11

    OK

    xCommand systemunit FactoryReset Confirm: Yes

The device will then reboot. When complete, the device will be reset
to factory defaults and will require further configuration before use.

Certain Cisco TelePresence System Integrator C Series and Cisco
TelePresence EX Series devices can also be restored to factory
defaults by performing a series of actions on the physical device.
Please view the device operations guide to utilize such a method.

Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html

Or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at:
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml

Do not contact psirt at cisco.com or security-alert at cisco.com for
software upgrades.

Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com

Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.

The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.

Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: tac at cisco.com

Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to
a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
requested through the TAC.

Refer to:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html

For additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================

The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

The vulnerability was discovered during an internal audit of affected
devices.

Status of this Notice: Final
============================

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.

Distribution
============

This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:

http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20111109-telepresence-c-ex-series

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

  * cust-security-announce at cisco.com
  * first-teams at first.org
  * bugtraq at securityfocus.com
  * vulnwatch at vulnwatch.org
  * cisco at spot.colorado.edu
  * cisco-nsp at puck.nether.net
  * full-disclosure at lists.grok.org.uk
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisco at newsgate.cisco.com

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History
================

+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
|    Revision 0.1     |    2011-11-08    |     Initial Release      |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html

This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt

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