[c-nsp] Best practise/security design for BGP and OSPF

[Saku Ytti]

On 23 May 2017 at 12:00,  <adamv0025 at netconsultings.com> wrote:

Hey,

> Regarding OSPF,
> Best security is to use it solely for routing PE loopbacks (i.e. no
> connectivity outside the core).

But because it's IP, you might receive spooffed packet further down
the line and believe you received it from far-end. So OP's question
about TTL-security is valid one, and I'd support that. I'd also run
MD5 auth.
But of course if you have good iACL, stopping internet from sending
other than ICMP, UDP highports to links and loops, you should be
pretty safe.

ISIS and OSPF have quite interesting properties, ISIS is more secure
out-of-the-box, but in many cases you cannot stop box from punting
CLNS packets, so any edge-interface may reach control-plane by crafted
CLNS packets (without ISIS being configured on the interface).
Where-as OSPF out-of-the-box is less secure due to IP, but pretty much
every box supports ACLs, allowing you to consistently protect box.'

-- 
  ++ytti