[cisco-voip] Robo Call DoS

[Matthew Loraditch]

Technically. For a network there is gear that can do it. Radware among one of them and the one we use via our carrier and it works. An effective defense has to have a larger pipe somewhere with mitigation services at a capacity well above your capacity.

I don’t think the CAPTCHA would work, the person just calls and calls tying up the available trunks. You’d need the CAPTCHA to be on the attacker’s end. Based on the description I got they aren’t caring about an answer they are essentially just trying to keep the lines always busy.


Matthew Loraditch
Sr. Network Engineer
p: 443.541.1518
w: www.heliontechnologies.com | e: MLoraditch at heliontechnologies.com
From: Anthony Holloway <avholloway+cisco-voip at gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, April 16, 2018 11:23 AM
To: Matthew Loraditch <MLoraditch at heliontechnologies.com>
Cc: cisco-voip at puck.nether.net
Subject: Re: [cisco-voip] Robo Call DoS

Technically or legally?

How does one stop a DoS attack on a network?  Or on anything for that matter?  Say you were attending a protest, and someone is blowing an air horn in your ear<https://youtu.be/cvAMkDGKelQ?t=80>?  What can you do?

Technically, you could front end the whole thing with a captcha style gate, so you could ask to push a single button, button combination, or solve a simple addition problem resulting in two digits.  granted, just like on the web, a captcha is burdensome to the user, but generally, it's preferable over the site being down, or disrupted.

CUC and UCCX both could handle this task, though it would be easier in UCCX.

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 9:49 AM Matthew Loraditch <MLoraditch at heliontechnologies.com<mailto:MLoraditch at heliontechnologies.com>> wrote:
So this is a curiosity question, we had a prospective client call us who is essentially getting robocalled to oblivion. Some scammer has robo dialers setup and is flooding all of their trunks. He got a ransom, stopped and then started again. He was originally using one number and then when the telco blocked that switching to random sources.
Are there are any legitimate defenses to this sort of thing?


Matthew Loraditch​

Sr. Network Engineer


p: 443.541.1518<tel:443.541.1518>



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