[cisco-voip] CUCM and Auto Fill Credentials

[Stephen Welsh]

While we are on the subject here are some other non encrypted TFTP server items:


  *   ConfigFileCacheList.txt
  *   FileList.txt
  *   BinFileCacheList.txt
  *   PerfMon.txt
  *   ParamList.txt
  *   lddefault.cfg

So you could use the following to get a list of all the device MAC addresses anonymously from the TFTP server:

http://TFTPServer:6970/FileList.txt<http://tftpserver:6970/FileList.txt>

So with the scenario you describe and just the TFTP Server IP Address you could scan all the device configs on the cluster to see if even just one of them has the admin credentials saved accidentally on the SSH User/Password field.

I suspect this may apply to most clusters....

Kind Regards

Stephen Welsh
CTO
UnifiedFX

On 15 Mar 2018, at 07:25, Stephen Welsh <stephen.welsh at unifiedfx.com<mailto:stephen.welsh at unifiedfx.com>> wrote:

Hi Anthony,

Yes, the SSH credentials saved on the device page are available in clear text in the phone XML config, it’s not just your environment unfortunately. Also I believe the same thing applies for the Telepresence endpoints (anything running CE including the DX) for the web page admin credentials that are saved in the vendor config section.

We noticed this a little while ago but given most people did not populate it did not consider as a serious issue, however the auto-population of credentials is not something we considered. So yes this does look like a serious problem when you combine those two together.

Kind Regards

Stephen Welsh
CTO
UnifiedFX

On 15 Mar 2018, at 01:50, Anthony Holloway <avholloway+cisco-voip at gmail.com<mailto:avholloway+cisco-voip at gmail.com>> wrote:

I'm working on something, and was wondering if you could check something for me, so I can better understand why and how often this is happening.

So, I was looking at phone config file today, and I noticed the ccmadmin username and password was in the XML, and in plain text nonetheless.

I found out that the browser, when told to remember your credentials, will treat the SSH username/password fields as login fields whenever you modify a phone, and you might be unknowingly save your credentials for clear text view by unauthenticated users.

Is anyone already aware of this?

You could you run the following command on your clusters:

run sql select name, sshuserid from device where sshuserid is not null and sshuserid <> ""

Then in the output, if there are any hits, look at the config XML file for the phone and see if the passwords are there.

E.g.,

output might be:

SEP6899CD84B710 aholloway

So then you would navigate your browser to:

http://<tftpserver>:6970/SEP6899CD84B710.cnf.xml

You then might have to view the HTML source of the page, because the browser might mess up the output.

You're then looking for the following two fields, your results will vary:

<sshUserId>aholloway</sshUserId>
<sshPassword>MyP at ssw0rd</sshPassword>

Then, since we now know it's happening, get list of how many different usernames you have with this command:

run sql select distinct sshuserid from device where sshuserid is not null and sshuserid <> "" order by sshuserid

This could also be happening with Energy Wise settings, albeit not on the same web pages.

I'm curious about two things:

1) Is it even happening outside of my limited testing scenarios?
2) How many different usernames and passwords were there?

If the answers are yes, and 1 or more, then this is an issue Cisco should address.

The reason it's happening is because the way in which browsers identify login forms, is different from the way in which web developers understand it to work.  Cisco uses the element attribute on these fields "autocomplete = false" and unfortunately, most browser ignore that directive.

I have noticed that this does not happen, if you have more than 1 saved password for the same site, rather it will only happen if you use the same login for the entire site.  Our highest chance of seeing this happen are for operations teams where they login with their own accounts, and do not use DRS or OS Admin.
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