[j-nsp] Core network design for an ISP
Adam.Vitkovsky at gamma.co.uk
Fri Mar 25 15:39:04 EDT 2016
T: 0333 006 5936
E: Adam.Vitkovsky at gamma.co.uk
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> From: Saku Ytti [mailto:saku at ytti.fi]
> Sent: Friday, March 25, 2016 5:50 PM
> To: Adam Vitkovsky
> Cc: Luis Balbinot; jnsp list
> Subject: Re: [j-nsp] Core network design for an ISP
> On 25 March 2016 at 19:42, Adam Vitkovsky
> <Adam.Vitkovsky at gamma.co.uk> wrote:
> Hey Adam,
> > My understanding is that MX does not support(yet) "selective VRF
> > download" (don't know the juniper name for the feature) Anyways Cisco
> stopped using it as it was causing more problems than it solved.
> I believe Luis refers to FIB localisation introduced in 12.3:
Hmm interesting concept -then with this feature enabled where would the VRF filter be executed on FIB-remote PFE or FIB-local PFE?
> > Also since you folks talk about converged networks that is mixing services
> and internet on one network -have you tested how the kit performs in
> corner cases (DDoS), would love to hear your experiences.
> I've tried to punish MX in lab quite a bit and have found issues in ddos-
> protection behaviour, some very dramatic. But today, AFAIK, correctly
> configured MX is very robust against control-plane attacks, much more so
> than ASR9k. But out-of-the-box ASR9k is much better defended. And I've not
> yet read any lo0 filter anywhere which isn't fundamentally broken, including
> cymry secure templates.
Sorry I wasn’t clear I meant how the box performs when under DDoS attack.
But yeah I guess I know what you mean with regards to lo0 filters I've been there, what I miss in Junos is the ability to say that only defined interfaces can be used to access the box. So one has to be very careful with the filter construction as well as understand the lo0 filter applicability rules posted here recently.
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