[nsp-sec] 700K *abused* resolver list? - mitigation notes
Mike Lewinski
mike at rockynet.com
Wed Apr 15 18:29:34 EDT 2009
I worked with a customer to test his fix for Microsoft DNS. Disabling
recursion alone is sufficient to also stop root server record leakage,
and that's fine for people running auth-only servers. However it seems
that there is no way to restrict recursion by subnet in Windows DNS,
which means that port 53 has to be externally blocked if recursion is
needed.
This also means there is no safe hybrid caching/auth configuration for
MS-DNS users. Fortunately I think that configuration is somewhat rare,
though I have encountered at least one.
Another customer running a hybrid bind9 auth/recursive server reports
that "additional-from-cache no;" hasn't broken anything yet. I'm taking
his report with a grain of salt because I don't think he has that many
resolver clients.
Mike
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