[nsp-sec] Revisiting the DDOS Route Server project

John Fraizer john at op-sec.us
Fri Aug 14 13:35:28 EDT 2009


On Thu, Aug 13, 2009 at 6:15 AM, Scott A. McIntyre <scott at xs4all.net> wrote:

> ----------- nsp-security Confidential --------
>
> I think that Hank's point is that the way most of us have the DDoS-RS
> peerings set up we only null-route traffic sent *to* addresses advertised.
>  I'm not sure how many have tried to make the right router-fu that would
> actually reject packets *from* entries based on some routing policy
> statements/maps/whatever.  I've never looked into that, but certainly we
> only use it as a list of addresses to dump as a destination.
>
>
Not much router-fu involved.

uRPF will kill the traffic in both directions, provided that the traffic
passes an interface with uRPF configured.

IE; Configure loose-mode uRPF on as many interfaces as possible on your
routers.

On cisco, add the following to the interface config:

ip verify unicast source reachable-via any

On Juniper, it's as simple as adding the following to the interface config:

rpf-check {
 mode loose;
}



This comes in handy-dandy when you take a DDoS.  You can null-route the
attacking addresses and their traffic gets dropped on the first uRPF
interface it reaches on your network.  No muss, no fuss.

If your peers are RTBH friendly, you can even possibly pass those RTBH NLRIs
up to them with their RTBH community attached and they'll nuke the traffic
before it touches your pipe.

Here's an example from one of our peering connections:



!
interface TenGigabitEthernet4/0/0
 ip address x.x.x.x 255.255.255.252
 ip verify unicast source reachable-via any
 ip flow ingress
 load-interval 30
end
!
ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 Null0
!

#sh ip route 12.204.121.73
Routing entry for 12.204.121.73/32
  Known via "bgp 11456", distance 200, metric 0
  Tag 65334, type internal
  Last update from 192.0.2.1 7w0d ago
  Routing Descriptor Blocks:
  * 192.0.2.1, from x.x.x.x, 7w0d ago
      Route metric is 0, traffic share count is 1
      AS Hops 1
      Route tag 65334

Now, since the RTBH NLRI has the next-hop of 192.0.2.1, which is null-routed
on the router, both traffic to *and* traffic from are null-routed because
traffic from that host will fail the RPF check since our best route to it is
null.


John



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