[nsp-sec] 60% of the phpmyadmin installs are vulnerable :( was SSH scanning - we are now up over 1000
Smith, Donald
Donald.Smith at qwest.com
Mon Aug 16 15:47:09 EDT 2010
Patrick Thomas over at qualys.com wrote in today and shared this with the handlers.
I asked him if it was ok to share this and he said yes, he wanted credit, and he offered to provide similar
exploitable information in the future if we ever need something like this.
In case anyone here wants to get a hold of him here is his email address.
E-Mail: pthomas at qualys.com
"Hi SANS,
I'm a little late to the phpMyAdmin story, but I too was disappointed in the number of people who are unpatched against this. I had some numbers sitting around from recent webapp fingerprinting work (https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-1401) that I thought you might be interested in.
Scanned on June 18, the % of net-visible phpMyAdmin installations unpatched against PMASA-2009-3/CVE-2009-1151: 60.75%
(52.2% are running a vulnerable version in the 2.x branch, 8.6% are running a vulnerable version in the 3.x branch)
As usual, the barn doors are wide open. <sigh>
Cheers,
Patrick"
(coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
Donald.Smith at qwest.com gcia
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kevin Oberman [mailto:oberman at es.net]
> Sent: Thursday, August 12, 2010 8:12 AM
> To: Joel Rosenblatt
> Cc: Smith, Donald; 'nsp-security at puck.nether.net'
> Subject: Re: [nsp-sec] SSH scanning - we are now up over 1000
>
> > Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2010 06:35:19 -0400
> > From: Joel Rosenblatt <joel at columbia.edu>
> >
> > Hi Donald,
> >
> > Thanks for putting this together.
> >
> > It does appear that whatever they are doing, the attack
> code is becoming more efficient
> >
> > Incident Attempts Attackers
> >
> > 8/12 22/tcp 7587050 32
> > 8/11 22/tcp 8524225 875
> > 8/10 22/tcp 6724109 1028
> > 8/9 22/tcp 3645405 618
> > 8/8 22/tcp 6176237 835
> >
> > Note that even though the number of attackers from last
> night is back to my normal of around 30, the total number of
> attempts had not gone down significantly.
> >
> > There are a lot less of them, but they are trying harder :-)
> >
> > Regards,
> > Joel
>
> Looks like this round is over. At 9:10 UTC this morning all activity
> suddenly stopped. Guess they may have finished running through their
> list of accounts. The last one was 'wsmith'. Since that time, no
> attempts at all
> --
> R. Kevin Oberman, Network Engineer
> Energy Sciences Network (ESnet)
> Ernest O. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Berkeley Lab)
> E-mail: oberman at es.net Phone: +1 510 486-8634
> Key fingerprint:059B 2DDF 031C 9BA3 14A4 EADA 927D EBB3 987B 3751
>
> >
> > --On Wednesday, August 11, 2010 3:27 PM -0600 "Smith,
> Donald" <Donald.Smith at qwest.com> wrote:
> >
> > > We asked for and received lots of additional information
> and binaries for the dd_ssh/phpmyadmin issue.
> > >
> > > https://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=9370
> > >
> > > We have received some reports about a new SSH brute force
> script, possibly named dd_ssh, that gets dropped onto web
> servers, most likely via an older
> > > phpmyadmin vulnerability. If you have sample log entries
> from a successful attack or can share a copy of dd_ssh,
> please let us know. The current DShield
> > > figures do show a recent uptick in the number of sources
> that participate in SSH scanning.
> > >
> > > Update 1735UTC: We have received several samples of
> dd_ssh, with MD5 24dac6bab595cd9c3718ea16a3804009. If your
> MD5 differs, please still send us a copy. It
> > > also looks like the vulnerability exploited is indeed in
> phpmyadmin, but seems to be the rather old CVE-2009-1151.
> Again, if your information differs, please
> > > let us know. Thanks to all the ISC readers who responded so far!
> > >
> > > Update 2005UTC: Several readers have identified
> 91-193-157-206 as the most likely original source of the
> scanning for phpmyadmin's setup.exe. If successful,
> > > two files named "vmsplice.txt" and "dd.txt" were
> downloaded from that same IP. How exactly dd_ssh was
> installed is not yet clear, but most readers found it
> > > in /tmp after a POST request to
> phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.exe. A running dd_ssh was seen to
> talk to a bunch of IPs over port 54509 and 54510, this is most
> > > likely the C&C connection.
> > >
> > > Update 2020UTC: We got it reasonably established that the
> vulnerability exploited to drop the SSH scanner was indeed
> CVE-2009-1151. C'mon, folks, if you
> > > insist to have your phpmyadmin reachable from the
> Internet (why would you?? Access control isn't hard!) then
> please at least upgrade to the most current
> > > version, which at this time is 2.11.10 or 3.3.5.
> > >
> > >
> > > I have looked at a pcap and validated the control ports.
> > > I have run a netflow report but not sure how much good it
> is without a lot of filtering as the control ports (54509 and
> 54510) are legit empherial ports:(
> > >
> > >
> > > (coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
> > > Donald.Smith at qwest.com gcia
> > >
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: nsp-security-bounces at puck.nether.net
> > >> [mailto:nsp-security-bounces at puck.nether.net] On Behalf Of
> > >> Kevin Oberman
> > >> Sent: Tuesday, August 10, 2010 11:57 AM
> > >> To: Joel Rosenblatt
> > >> Cc: nsp-security at puck.nether.net
> > >> Subject: Re: [nsp-sec] SSH scanning - we are now up over 1000
> > >>
> > >> ----------- nsp-security Confidential --------
> > >>
> > >> > Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2010 10:02:15 -0400
> > >> > From: Joel Rosenblatt <joel at columbia.edu>
> > >> > Sender: nsp-security-bounces at puck.nether.net
> > >> >
> > >> > ----------- nsp-security Confidential --------
> > >> >
> > >> >
> > >> > Hi,
> > >> >
> > >> > Looks like this is going to get worse before it gets worse
> > >> ... list attached.
> > >> >
> > >> > Thanks,
> > >> > Joel
> > >> >
> > >> > Joel Rosenblatt, Manager Network & Computer Security
> > >> > Columbia Information Security Office (CISO)
> > >> > Columbia University, 612 W 115th Street, NY, NY 10025
> / 212 854 3033
> > >> > http://www.columbia.edu/~joel
> > >>
> > >> This is the worst of these I've seen and it just keeps
> > >> getting heavier.
> > >>
> > >> I have been seeing over 500 new unique source addresses
> daily from the
> > >> start of this and the number is growing daily. I only
> had 960 unique
> > >> new addresses this morning, but I have rather careful
> vetting to avoid
> > >> false positives as we feed this data into our RTBH and I
> don't want to
> > >> block any legitimate access. I'm sure that if I looked
> at the data
> > >> manually, theat I would have a number of added hits.
> > >>
> > >> BTW, all of the attempts log are reported to the Cymru
> > >> brute-force list
> > >> for inclusion in the daily reports.
> > >> --
> > >> R. Kevin Oberman, Network Engineer
> > >> Energy Sciences Network (ESnet)
> > >> Ernest O. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Berkeley Lab)
> > >> E-mail: oberman at es.net Phone: +1
> 510 486-8634
> > >> Key fingerprint:059B 2DDF 031C 9BA3 14A4 EADA 927D EBB3
> 987B 3751
> > >>
> > >>
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