[nsp-sec] contact at AS1239 needed, need to nuke 80.81.192.0/23 prefix

[Gert Doering]

Hi,

is there a contact at 1239 around that can help nuke a rogue prefix 
leaked by 4766?

route-views>sh ip b 80.81.192.0/23
BGP routing table entry for 80.81.192.0/23, version 4108794431
Paths: (27 available, best #9, table Default-IP-Routing-Table)
  Not advertised to any peer
  3277 3267 174 1239 4766 4766 4766 4766 4766
    194.85.102.33 from 194.85.102.33 (194.85.4.4)
      Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external
      Community: 3277:3267 3277:65100 3277:65320 3277:65326 3277:65330

this is *half* the exchange point prefix of DECIX in Frankfurt, and
is leaked by Korea Telekom.  The only transit visible is 1239.

This is hurting a lot, because a number of ISPs at DECIX both lack
proper ingress filters and accept this prefix from their upstreams, and
also lack proper "no proxy-arp" configs at their IXP ports, so BGP
at DECIX is massively impacted right now.

This would be very much appreciated.

(If you need to convince yourself that this request is legit, feel free
to verify the route objects for the /23 and /22 in the RIPE IRR DB)

thanks,

gert

-- 
USENET is *not* the non-clickable part of WWW!
                                                           //www.muc.de/~gert/
Gert Doering - Munich, Germany                             gert at greenie.muc.de
fax: +49-89-35655025                        gert at net.informatik.tu-muenchen.de
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