[nsp-sec] Info share: REN-ISAC alert DNS Amplification attacks

Smith, Donald Donald.Smith at CenturyLink.com
Wed May 8 14:39:35 EDT 2013


Minor nit, BCP38 is intended to block ingress traffic not egress traffic.
" - Apply BCP38 filtering to prevent spoofed source address traffic from
     leaving your network. "

"Network Ingress Filtering:        
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ
IP Source Address Spoofing"

So it should probably be from entering your network:) 

(coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
 Donald.Smith at centurylink.com



From: nsp-security [nsp-security-bounces at puck.nether.net] on behalf of Gabriel Iovino [giovino at ren-isac.net]
Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2013 12:13 PM
To: NSP nsp-security
Subject: [nsp-sec] Info share: REN-ISAC alert DNS Amplification attacks


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Greetings,

The REN-ISAC released an alert to .edu today regarding DNS Amplification
attacks.

CIO version of the Alert
http://www.ren-isac.net/alerts/dns_amp_ddos_cio_201305.html

Technical version of the Alert
http://www.ren-isac.net/alerts/dns_amp_ddos_tech_201305.html

I share this with nsp-sec as most of us have constituents we are
attempting persuade to mitigate open resolvers and implement bcp38.
Maybe text from this alert will save you some time? Please feel free to
borrow/steal from it as you see fit.

A special thank you to everyone referenced in the alert, you are doing a
lot of the heaving lifting.

Here are a few other recent alerts I am aware of:

US-CERT Alert (TA13-088A) DNS Amplification Attacks
http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A

DNS amplification attacks and open DNS resolvers
https://www.cert.be/pro/docs/dns-amplification-attacks-and-open-dns-resolvers

[slight topic change -> remediation experience]

When DNS amplification attacks are being shared in various remediation
communities and we alert our constituents we see ~30-40% remediation in
the first 24 hours. We also get feedback that:

1. Organizations have plans in place to mitigate open recursive resolvers

2. These notifications are helping them make the business case
internally to do the right thing.

Keep the attack data sets coming!

thank you

Gabe

- --
Gabriel Iovino
Principal Security Engineer, REN-ISAC
http://www.ren-isac.net
24x7 Watch Desk +1(317)278-6630
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