[VoiceOps] Broadsoft SIP Trunks and ILD Fraud

[Robert Dawson]

Broadsoft had a fraud prevention best practices document that detailed disabling call forwarding and voice portal dialing through the voice portal. It addressed password hardening as well. You should be able to find it on Xchange. Voice portal calling is dangerous, it can be used to place calls directly but I have also seen it used as a social engineering tool. There are some devious people out there with a lot of time on their hands, if something can be exploited, eventually it will.

At my prior employer we did the same thing as Mark suggests - disabling international forwarding/transfers across the board by default and requiring the customer to sign a waiver if the capability was required.

Rob

From: voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Mark Holloway
Sent: Friday, December 30, 2011 1:09 PM
To: Zak Rupas
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Broadsoft SIP Trunks and ILD Fraud

Some items to check:

1) Do you have the voice portal enabled?  If yes, are you allowing users to dial into the voice portal and enable call forwarding to a PSTN number?
2) Do you provide open access to the web portal?  How is your username/password strength?  Once a user account is hacked through the web portal call forwarding is typically enabled for fraud purposes.
3) If you have the voice portal enabled, are you allowing users to obtain outside dial tone to place calls from the voice portal?

A best-practice I always observed was to modify the outgoing dial plan for every Group or Enterprise and disable international call forwarding/transfers. It is very rare customers in the U.S. require this and you are better off disabling by default but having your Sales team ask up front when gathering customer requirements if they really need this enabled.



On Dec 30, 2011, at 10:44 AM, Zak Rupas wrote:


Mark

All of SIP trunk customer have to Registers on the network. It's a requirement we adopted some time ago. I also just checked and Bursting is disabled on my latest account that had the issue. The had 5 SIP trunks but were averaging 20 CC ILD calls. So we may have encountered a Broadsoft bug. I am working on trying to come up with a plan for testing?

Zak Rupas
VoIP Engineer

SimpleSignal
3600 S Yosemite Suite 150
Denver, CO 80237
One Number Rings All My Phones: 303-242-8606
<image001.png>
SimpleSignal.com<http://www.simplesignal.com/> | Blog<http://www.simplesignal.com/blog> | Facebook<http://www.facebook.com/SimpleSignal?ref=ts> | Twitter<http://twitter.com/simplesignal>

From: Mark Holloway [mailto:mh at markholloway.com<mailto:mh at markholloway.com>]
Sent: Friday, December 30, 2011 10:38 AM
To: Zak Rupas
Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org<mailto:voiceops at voiceops.org>
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Broadsoft SIP Trunks and ILD Fraud

The IP PBX (or on-prem SBC) should be registering to Broadworks using the Pilot number.  The SBC in your core will only allow SIP Invites from the registered device.  If you have non-registered SIP Trunks in Broadworks this is very dangerous.


On Dec 30, 2011, at 9:36 AM, Zak Rupas wrote:

Good Morning Voice OPS

Is anyone else experiencing anything like this? If so please share what you have done / or will to make it stop

We have a series of smaller SIP trunk customers using Broadsoft trunk groups. By design the trunk groups have a concurrent call limitation based off the customer's order. These smaller SIP trunks groups when compromised are able to run up HUGE fraud bills even tho they only have 5 or 6 SIP trunks. Needing to know if anyone else is seeing this that has Broadsoft and what was done to protect yourselves?

Otherwise Happy NYE :)

Zak Rupas
VoIP Engineer

SimpleSignal
3600 S Yosemite Suite 150
Denver, CO 80237
One Number Rings All My Phones: 303-242-8606
<image001.png>
SimpleSignal.com<http://www.simplesignal.com/> | Blog<http://www.simplesignal.com/blog> | Facebook<http://www.facebook.com/SimpleSignal?ref=ts> | Twitter<http://twitter.com/simplesignal>

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