<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Thank you Glen and Paul, much appreciated! </div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Dec 2, 2020 at 5:19 PM Glen Gerhard <<a href="mailto:glen@cognexus.net">glen@cognexus.net</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<font size="+1">Sounds like a good plan to me. It might help to
figure out a few test call paths to verify the verstats directly.<br>
<br>
IMHO much of the S/S technology will be overshadowed by the
analytics providers in terms of call presentation/blocking. <br>
<br>
That said, S/S will be helpful to law agencies in tracking
malicious intent groups. This alone makes it worth the effort. A
lot of the work /benefit takes place at the vetting of corporate
ownership. S/S also provides Rich Call Data which replaces the
pathetic CNAM.<br>
<br>
The Delegated Certs extension will help with the call center
attestations but is still a ways off. Then you need your SBCs and
PBXs to support it.<br>
<br>
SIPNOC is next week and it's usually helpful.<br>
<a href="https://www.sipforum.org/news-events/sipnoc-2020-overview/#topics" target="_blank">https://www.sipforum.org/news-events/sipnoc-2020-overview/#topics</a><br>
<br>
<br>
~Glen<br>
</font><br>
<div>On 12/2/2020 1:49 PM, Patrick Labbett
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Hello, I'm
looking for guidance/feedback on the impact of STIR/SHAKEN on
the call center and answering service industries. Very few are
interconnected VoIP service providers themselves. </div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Specifically,
customers of these industries often desire the call center
utilize their company phone number when contacting their
employees or customers for an improved end-user experience. </div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">The worry is
that STIR/SHAKEN will be implemented in a way that causes
these "spoofed" calls (that have legitimate
business relationships in place) to be marked as such or
eventually blocked as STIR/SHAKEN tightens it's grip on
malicious intent. </div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Here is my
understanding of the situation: As a customer of an
Originating carrier, the Call Center's outbound calls will be
signed by their Originating carrier's STIR/SHAKEN certificate
- so as long as the SIP Identity header isn't modified in
transit and the certificate is validated on the Terminating
side, everything should continue to work normally for us as
end users. So this is largely the carrier's problem, and not
the call centers.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">However, it's
not clear (to me) how the Attestation aspect of things will
work (and if it even effects the typical customer): </div>
<div class="gmail_default">
<ul>
<li style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Does just
being a customer of the Originating Carrier give the Call
Center's calls Full Attestation?</li>
<li style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">As a call
center, if spoofing a number not owned/in inventory, would
that be Partial Attestation?</li>
<li style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Does the
owner/location of the spoofed number matter, i.e. :</li>
<ul style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">
<li>Partial Attestation: Number owned by Originating
carrier, but not by customer making call</li>
<li>Gateway Attestation: Number not owned by Originating
carrier (and by extension not owned by customer making
the call)</li>
</ul>
<li><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">Will
different Terminating carriers treat Attestation
designations differently?</font></li>
<li>Is this largely a framework that carriers will
implement some day in the future?</li>
</ul>
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Am I way
overthinking this? (Yes.) </div>
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">Thank you
in advance for any perspective you can offer, or resources
you can direct me to. </div>
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">My
personal plan of attack for call centers:</div>
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">
<ul>
<li>Document permission and business use case for numbers
spoofed on behalf of customers</li>
<li>That's it - that's the whole plan. </li>
<li>????</li>
</ul>
<div>Aside from making sure my carriers know I exist and
that I have permission to use those numbers, what else is
there?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">-Patrick
Labbett</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
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</blockquote>
<br>
<pre cols="72">--
Glen Gerhard
<a href="mailto:glen@cognexus.net" target="_blank">glen@cognexus.net</a>
858.324.4536
Cognexus, LLC
7891 Avenida Kirjah
San Diego, CA 92037</pre>
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