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<p>Would it? Or would SIP/TLS supplant that? <br>
</p>
<p>The VZ VPN requirement was a bad solution to a paranoid delusion
that really didnt solve anything. <br>
</p>
<p>As were all being dragged kicking and screaming into TLS based
peering for the sake of SHAKEN/STIR why not fully embrace what it
provides? <br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/27/2021 2:35 PM, Aryn Nakaoka
808.356.2901 wrote:<br>
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<div dir="ltr">If its SIP based, Verizon standard to run a VPN
would become a norm.
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<div><font size="2">Aryn Nakaoka<br>
<a
href="mailto:anakaoka@trinet-hi.com"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">anakaoka@trinet-hi.com</a><br>
Direct: 808.356.2901<br>
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<div><font size="2">518 Holokahana
Lane</font></div>
<div>Honolulu, Hi<font size="2"> 96817<br>
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<font size="2">AlohaTone
Mobile: <a
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moz-do-not-send="true">https://youtu.be/PdUyuf0hTYY</a></font></div>
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<div><font size="2">A Better
Solution <a
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target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.trinet-hi.com/abettersolution.pdf <br>
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<div><font size="2">Aloha Tone
PBX <a
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<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Sep 27, 2021 at 11:27
AM Ryan Delgrosso <<a href="mailto:ryandelgrosso@gmail.com"
moz-do-not-send="true">ryandelgrosso@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Do
we know this is a SIP/RTP targeted volumetric attack and those
arent <br>
just collateral damage in a more plebian attack aimed ad
portals/apis or <br>
routers?<br>
<br>
I can understand them being tight lipped but some transparency
helps the <br>
situation.<br>
<br>
I wonder if DHS is involved yet?<br>
<br>
On 9/27/2021 1:48 PM, Jay Hennigan via VoiceOps wrote:<br>
> On 9/27/21 13:30, Darren via VoiceOps wrote:<br>
>> I know it’s hard to be patient but I can’t imagine
they’re NOT all <br>
>> hands on deck.<br>
>><br>
>> The reality is probably that the DDoS attack is now
so big, they <br>
>> can’t handle it on their own, so they’re scrambling
to contract out <br>
>> with another provider who can handle it. That would
explain why the <br>
>> BGP routes they advertise have shifted. These DDoS
products typically <br>
>> take weeks to setup, so they’re likely having to
scramble. I’ll be <br>
>> surprised if this does NOT continue tomorrow
(unfortunately).<br>
><br>
> From my understanding this is not your typical volumetric
DDoS but <br>
> something specific to SIP or VoIP and thus the typical
scrubbing <br>
> services aren't going to be effective against the voice
side of things.<br>
><br>
> Obviously they are keeping things close to the vest in
order not to <br>
> give too much information to the bad guys but I agree
that it may take <br>
> some time to resolve.<br>
><br>
>> *From: *VoiceOps <<a
href="mailto:voiceops-bounces@voiceops.org" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">voiceops-bounces@voiceops.org</a>>
on behalf of Carlos <br>
>> Alvarez <<a href="mailto:caalvarez@gmail.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">caalvarez@gmail.com</a>><br>
>> *Date: *Monday, September 27, 2021 at 1:23 PM<br>
><br>
>> Generic SIP client here, and the ongoing "continue to
investigate" <br>
>> notices are infuriatingly like "we have no damn clue
what we're <br>
>> doing." Try explaining to customers why it's not
"our fault*" and <br>
>> that there's no way to estimate a repair time.<br>
><br>
> I think the ongoing "continue to investigate" messages
are fine. <br>
> They're obviously dealing with a major incident and
trying their best <br>
> to keep their customers informed. This IMHO beats
silence.<br>
><br>
>> *Our fault for choosing them I guess, but not
something we can fix in <br>
>> minutes.<br>
><br>
> The same thing could and has affected others. Voip.ms has
been dealing <br>
> with a similar attack for at least a week. We've had
excellent service <br>
> from Bandwidth for years and I trust that they will be
able to get <br>
> through this as well as anyone.<br>
><br>
> It's the nature of the legacy PSTN that redundant
providers or fast <br>
> failover for inbound calling isn't (yet) a thing.<br>
><br>
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