[c-nsp] Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliance and Cisco PIX Security Appliances
Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team
psirt at cisco.com
Wed Apr 8 12:01:39 EDT 2009
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Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco ASA Adaptive
Security Appliance and Cisco PIX Security Appliances
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20090408-asa
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090408-asa.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2009 April 08 1600 UTC (GMT)
Summary
=======
Multiple vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive
Security Appliances and Cisco PIX Security Appliances. This security
advisory outlines the details of these vulnerabilities:
* VPN Authentication Bypass when Account Override Feature is Used
vulnerability
* Crafted HTTP packet denial of service (DoS) vulnerability
* Crafted TCP Packet DoS vulnerability
* Crafted H.323 packet DoS vulnerability
* SQL*Net packet DoS vulnerability
* Access control list (ACL) bypass vulnerability
Workarounds are available for some of the vulnerabilities.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090408-asa.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The following is a list of the products affected by each vulnerability
as described in detail within this advisory.
VPN Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------
Cisco ASA or Cisco PIX security appliances that are configured for IPsec
or SSL-based remote access VPN and have the Override Account Disabled
feature enabled are affected by this vulnerability.
Note: The Override Account Disabled feature was introduced in Cisco
ASA software version 7.1(1). Cisco ASA and PIX software versions 7.1,
7.2, 8.0, and 8.1 are affected by this vulnerability. This feature is
disabled by default.
Crafted HTTP Packet DoS Vulnerability
+------------------------------------
Cisco ASA security appliances may experience a device reload that can be
triggered by a series of crafted HTTP packets, when configured for SSL
VPNs or when configured to accept Cisco Adaptive Security Device Manager
(ASDM) connections. Only Cisco ASA software versions 8.0 and 8.1 are
affected by this vulnerability.
Crafted TCP Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security appliances may experience a memory leak
that can be triggered by a series of crafted TCP packets. Cisco ASA and
Cisco PIX security appliances running versions 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 8.0, and
8.1 are affected when configured for any of the following features:
* SSL VPNs
* ASDM Administrative Access
* Telnet Access
* SSH Access
* Cisco Tunneling Control Protocol (cTCP) for Remote Access VPNs
* Virtual Telnet
* Virtual HTTP
* Transport Layer Security (TLS) Proxy for Encrypted Voice
Inspection
* Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access
* TCP Intercept
Crafted H.323 Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-------------------------------------
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security appliances may experience a device
reload that can be triggered by a series of crafted H.323 packets, when
H.323 inspection is enabled. H.323 inspection is enabled by default.
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX software versions 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 8.0, and 8.1
are affected by this vulnerability.
SQL*Net Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-------------------------------
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security appliances may experience a device
reload that can be triggered by a series of SQL*Net packets, when
SQL*Net inspection is enabled. SQL*Net inspection is enabled by default.
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX software versions 7.2, 8.0, and 8.1 are affected
by this vulnerability.
Access Control List Bypass Vulnerability
+---------------------------------------
A vulnerability exists in the Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security
appliances that may allow traffic to bypass the implicit deny behavior
at the end of ACLs that are configured within the device. Cisco ASA and
Cisco PIX software versions 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, and 8.0 are affected by this
vulnerability.
Determination of Software Versions
+---------------------------------
The "show version" command-line interface (CLI) command can be used to
determine whether a vulnerable version of the Cisco PIX or Cisco ASA
software is running. The following example shows a Cisco ASA Adaptive
Security Appliance that runs software version 8.0(4):
ASA#show version
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4)
Device Manager Version 6.0(1)
<output truncated>
The following example shows a Cisco PIX security appliance that runs
software version 8.0(4):
PIX#show version
Cisco PIX Security Appliance Software Version 8.0(4)
Device Manager Version 5.2(3)
<output truncated>
Customers who use Cisco ASDM to manage their devices can find the
software version displayed in the table in the login window or in the
upper left corner of the ASDM window.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
The Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500
Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers and Cisco VPN 3000 Series
Concentrators are not affected by any of these vulnerabilities. Cisco
PIX Security Appliance Software versions 6.x are not affected by any of
these vulnerabilities. No other Cisco products are currently known to be
affected by these vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities are independent of each other.
VPN Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------
The Cisco ASA or Cisco PIX security appliance can be configured to
override an account-disabled indication from a AAA server and allow
the user to log on anyway. However, the user must provide the correct
credentials in order to login to the VPN. A vulnerability exists in the
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security appliances where VPN users can bypass
authentication when the override account feature is enabled.
Note: The override account feature was introduced in Cisco ASA software
version 7.1(1).
The override account feature is enabled with the
"override-account-disable" command in "tunnel-group general-attributes"
configuration mode, as shown in the following example. The following
example allows overriding the "account-disabled" indicator from the AAA
server for the WebVPN tunnel group "testgroup":
hostname(config)#tunnel-group testgroup type webvpn
hostname(config)#tunnel-group testgroup general-attributes
hostname(config-tunnel-general)#override-account-disable
Note: The override account feature is disabled by default.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsx47543 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers
CVE-2009-1155.
Crafted HTTP Packet DoS Vulnerability
+------------------------------------
A crafted SSL or HTTP packet may cause a DoS condition on a Cisco
ASA device that is configured to terminate SSL VPN connections. This
vulnerability can also be triggered to any interface where ASDM access
is enabled. A successful attack may result in a reload of the device. A
TCP three-way handshake is not needed to exploit this vulnerability.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsv52239 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers
CVE-2009-1156.
Crafted TCP Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------
A crafted TCP packet may cause a memory leak on a Cisco ASA or Cisco PIX
device. A successful attack may result in a sustained DoS condition.
A Cisco ASA device configured for any of the following features is
affected:
* SSL VPNs
* ASDM Administrative Access
* Telnet Access
* SSH Access
* cTCP for Remote Access VPNs
* Virtual Telnet
* Virtual HTTP
* TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection
* Cut-Through Proxy for Network Access
* TCP Intercept
Note: This vulnerability may be triggered when crafted packets are sent
to any TCP based service that terminates on the affected device. The
vulnerability may also be triggered via transient traffic only if the
TCP intercept features has been enabled. A TCP three-way handshake is
not needed to exploit this vulnerability.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsy22484 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers
CVE-2009-1157.
Crafted H.323 Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-------------------------------------
A crafted H.323 packet may cause a DoS condition on a Cisco ASA device
that is configured with H.323 inspection. H.323 inspection is enabled by
default. A successful attack may result in a reload of the device. A TCP
three-way handshake is not needed to exploit this vulnerability.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsx32675 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers
CVE-2009-1158.
SQL*Net Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-------------------------------
The SQL*Net protocol consists of different packet types are handled by
the security appliance to make the data stream appear consistent to the
Oracle version 7.x and earlier implementations on either side of the
Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security appliances. A series of SQL*Net packets
may cause a denial of service condition on a Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX
device that is configured with SQL*Net inspection. SQL*Net inspection is
enabled by default. A successful attack may result in a reload of the
device.
The default port assignment for SQL*Net is TCP port 1521. This is the
value used by Oracle for SQL*Net. Please note the "class-map" command
can be used in the Cisco ASA or Cisco PIX to apply SQL*Net inspection
to a range of different port numbers. A TCP three-way handshake is
needed to exploit this vulnerability. The requirement of a TCP three way
handshake significantly reduces the possibility of exploitation using
packets with spoofed source addresses.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsw51809 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers
CVE-2009-1159.
Access Control List Bypass Vulnerability
+---------------------------------------
Access lists have an implicit deny behavior that is applied to packets
that have not matched any of the permit or deny ACEs in an ACL and reach
the end of the ACL. This implicit deny is there by design, does not
require any configuration and can be understood as an implicit ACE that
denies all traffic reaching the end of the ACL. A vulnerability exists
in the Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX that may allow traffic to bypass the
implicit deny ACE.
Note: This behavior only impacts the implicit deny statement on any
ACL applied on the device. Access control lists with explicit deny
statements are not affected by this vulnerability. This vulnerability is
experienced in very rare occasions and extremely hard to reproduce.
You can trace the lifespan of a packet through the security appliance
to see whether the packet is operating correctly with the packet tracer
tool. The "packet-tracer" command provides detailed information about
the packets and how they are processed by the security appliance. If a
command from the configuration did not cause the packet to drop, the
"packet-tracer" command will provide information about the cause in an
easily readable manner. You can use this feature to see if the implicit
deny on an ACL is not taking effect. The following example shows that
the implicit deny is bypassed (result = ALLOW):
<output truncated>
...
Phase: 2
Type: ACCESS-LIST
Subtype:
Result: ALLOW
Config:
Implicit Rule
Additional Information:
Forward Flow based lookup yields rule:
in id=0x1a09d350, priority=1, domain=permit, deny=false
hits=1144595557, user_data=0x0, cs_id=0x0, l3_type=0x8
src mac=0000.0000.0000, mask=0000.0000.0000
dst mac=0000.0000.0000, mask=0000.0000.0000
<output truncated>
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsq91277 and has
been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers
CVE-2009-1160.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* AAA account-override-ignore allows VPN session without correct
password (CSCsx47543)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - None
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.8
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* Cisco ASA may crash with certain HTTP packets (CSCsv52239)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* Cisco ASA may crash after processing certain TCP packets (CSCsy22484)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* Crafted H.323 packet may cause ASA to reload (CSCsx32675)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* sqlnet traffic causes traceback with inspection configured
(CSCsw51809)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - High
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* ACL Misbehavior in Cisco ASA (CSCsq91277)
CVSS Base Score - 4.3
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Medium
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Partial
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - None
CVSS Temporal Score - 3.6
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the VPN Authentication Bypass when Account
Override Feature is Used vulnerability may allow an attacker to
successfully connect to the Cisco ASA via remote access IPSec or
SSL-based VPN. The Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities may cause a
reload of the affected device. Repeated exploitation could result in
a sustained DoS condition. Successful exploitation of the ACL bypass
vulnerability may allow an attacker to access resources that should be
protected by the Cisco ASA.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
The following table contains the first fixed software release of each
vulnerability. The "Recommended Release" row indicates the releases
which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time
of this Advisory. A device running a version of the given release in
a specific row (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be
vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later
than the release in the "Recommended Release" row of the table.
+------------------------------------------------------+
| | Affected | First | Recommended |
| Vulnerability | Release | Fixed | Release |
| | | Version | |
|----------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.0 | Not | 7.0(8)6 |
| VPN | | vulnerable | |
|Authentication |----------+------------+-------------|
| Bypass when | 7.1 | 7.1(2)82 | 7.1(2)82 |
|Account |----------+------------+-------------|
| Override | 7.2 | 7.2(4)27 | 7.2(4)30 |
|Feature is |----------+------------+-------------|
| Used | 8.0 | 8.0(4)25 | 8.0(4)28 |
|Vulnerability |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.1 | 8.1(2)15 | 8.1(2)19 |
|----------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.0 | Not | 7.0(8)6 |
| | | vulnerable | |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.1 | Not | 7.1(2)82 |
| Crafted HTTP | | vulnerable | |
|packet DoS |----------+------------+-------------|
| Vulnerability | 7.2 | Not | 7.2(4)30 |
| | | vulnerable | |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.0 | 8.0(4)25 | 8.0(4)28 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.1 | 8.1(2)15 | 8.1(2)16 |
|----------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.0 | 7.0(8)6 | 7.0(8)6 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.1 | 7.1(2)82 | 7.1(2)82 |
|Crafted TCP |----------+------------+-------------|
| Packet DoS | 7.2 | 7.2(4)30 | 7.2(4)30 |
|Vulnerability |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.0 | 8.0(4)28 | 8.0(4)28 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.1 | 8.1(2)19 | 8.1(2)19 |
|----------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.0 | 7.0(8)6 | 7.0(8)6 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.1 | 7.1(2)82 | 7.1(2)82 |
|Crafted H.323 |----------+------------+-------------|
| packet DoS | 7.2 | 7.2(4)26 | 7.2(4)30 |
|Vulnerability |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.0 | 8.0(4)24 | 8.0(4)28 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.1 | 8.1(2)14 | 8.1(2)19 |
|----------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.0 | Not | 7.0(8)6 |
| | | vulnerable | |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.1 | Not | 7.1(2)82 |
| Crafted SQL | | vulnerable | |
|packet DoS |----------+------------+-------------|
| vulnerability | 7.2 | 7.2(4)26 | 7.2(4)30 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.0 | 8.0(4)22 | 8.0(4)28 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.1 | 8.1(2)12 | 8.1(2)19 |
|----------------+----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.0 | 7.0(8)1 | 7.0(8)6 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 7.1 | 7.1(2)74 | 7.1(2)82 |
|Access control |----------+------------+-------------|
| list (ACL) | 7.2 | 7.2(4)9 | 7.2(4)30 |
|bypass |----------+------------+-------------|
| vulnerability | 8.0 | 8.0(4)5 | 8.0(4)28 |
| |----------+------------+-------------|
| | 8.1 | Not | 8.1(2)19 |
| | | vulnerable | |
+------------------------------------------------------+
Fixed Cisco ASA software can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ASAPSIRT
Fixed Cisco PIX software can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/PIXPSIRT
Workarounds
===========
This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities and their respective workarounds are independent
of each other.
VPN Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------
The override account feature is enabled with the
"override-account-disable" command in "tunnel-group general-attributes"
configuration mode. As a workaround, disable this feature using the "no
override-account-disable" command.
Crafted HTTP Packet DoS Vulnerability
+------------------------------------
Devices configured for SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) or accepting
ASDM management connections are vulnerable.
Note: IPSec clients are not vulnerable to this vulnerability.
If SSL VPN (clientless or client-based) is not used, administrators
should make sure that ASDM connections are only allowed from trusted
hosts.
To identify the IP addresses from which the security appliance
accepts HTTPS connections for ASDM, configure the "http" command for
each trusted host address or subnet. The following example, shows
how a trusted host with IP address 192.168.1.100 is added to the
configuration:
hostname(config)# http 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255
Crafted TCP Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-----------------------------------
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability.
Crafted H.323 Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-------------------------------------
H.323 inspection should be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily
disabling the feature will mitigate this vulnerability. H.323 inspection
can be disabled with the command "no inspect h323".
SQL*Net Packet DoS Vulnerability
+-------------------------------
SQL*Net inspection should be disabled if it is not needed. Temporarily
disabling the feature will mitigate this vulnerability. SQL*Net
inspection can be disabled with the command "no inspect sqlnet".
Access Control List (ACL) Bypass Vulnerability
+---------------------------------------------
As a workaround, remove the "access-group" line applied on the interface
where the ACL is configured and re-apply it. For example:
ASA(config)#no access-group acl-inside in interface inside
ASA(config)#access-group acl-inside in interface inside
In the previous example the access group called "acl-inside" is removed
and reapplied to the inside interface. Alternatively, you can add an
explicit "deny ip any any" line in the bottom of the ACL applied on that
interface. For example:
ASA(config)#access-list 100 deny ip any any
In the previous example, an explicit deny for all IP traffic is added at
the end of "access-list 100".
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the
network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion
document for this advisory, which is available at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20090408-asa.shtml.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt at cisco.com or security-alert at cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac at cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
The crafted TCP packet DoS vulnerability was discovered and reported
to Cisco by Gregory W. MacPherson and Robert J. Combo from Verizon
Business.
The ACL bypass vulnerability was reported to Cisco by Jon Ramsey and
Jeff Jarmoc from SecureWorks.
The Cisco PSIRT greatly appreciates the opportunity to work with
researchers on security vulnerabilities, and welcomes the opportunity to
review and assist in product reports.
All other vulnerabilities were found during internal testing and during
the resolution of customer service requests.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090408-asa.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce at cisco.com
* first-bulletins at lists.first.org
* bugtraq at securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch at vulnwatch.org
* cisco at spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp at puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure at lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco at newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2009-April-08 | Initial public release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
incidents, and registering to receive security information
from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2008-2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Apr 08, 2009 Document ID: 109974
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