[VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...

Anthony Orlando avorlando at yahoo.com
Tue Aug 19 09:23:09 EDT 2014

i was thinking a conf call.  Maybe 4-5 participants.  Let me know who's interested.

On Tuesday, August 19, 2014 12:39 AM, Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:

Discuss away, were all riveted with antici......


On 8/18/2014 7:52 PM, Anthony Orlando via VoiceOps wrote:

  I might have a solution that I'd like to talk to the group about. It can not only detect but could use your switch API to take action. Who's interested in discussing it!

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 18, 2014, at 9:59 PM, Tim Jackson <jackson.tim at gmail.com> wrote:

I think Ryan's point here is getting data on in-progress calls into it instead of completed calls..
>AFAIK CPM basically watches the real time call logs from the CFS, and only knows about calls once they complete.
>On Aug 18, 2014 6:04 PM, "Simon Dredge" <Simon.Dredge at metaswitch.com> wrote:
>Heya, Ryan - It's SAS-like - But proactive analysis rather than reactive analytics. It'll trigger immediately (in real-time) on an anomaly, informing the operator that action is required so they can take necessary action.
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Ryan Delgrosso [mailto:ryandelgrosso at gmail.com]
>>Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 4:32 PM
>>To: Simon Dredge
>>Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
>>Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones ...
>>I think the gotcha with CPM in this scenario is its a
              great tool for determining "this has happened" but not so
              great for building a mitigation solution.
>>Is CPM driven off of CDR's or off of the SAS datastream or
              some other source?
>>If its CDR driven you will be blind to this problem
              because you wont be measuring calls that are rejected due
              to lack of capacity(no cdr cut).
>>If its driven off of SAS data you will get the
              missed/incomplete call stats but at the cost of speed
              (multiple orders of magnitude more data than CDR's)
>>It would be interesting to hear if this perhaps uses a
              different datasource. Perhaps there is a facility in
              perimeta that informs this better than CFS data sources.
>>On 8/18/2014 3:36 PM, Simon Dredge wrote:
>>> I know many meta-users like the new-ish call pattern
              monitor. It uses weighted profiling benchmarking algos
              similar to NBAD:
>>> http://www.metaswitch.com/sites/default/files/Metaswitch-Call-Pattern-
>>> Monitor.pdf
>>> Cheers,
>>> Simon.
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-bounces at voiceops.org] On Behalf Of
>>> Ryan Delgrosso
>>> Sent: Monday, August 18, 2014 1:53 PM
>>> To: ECG - Mark Lindsey
>>> Cc: voiceops at voiceops.org
>>> Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] Hackers Crash Clay Co. Phones
>>> I dunno that's a slippery slope. Im not a proponent
              of putting management of your network services into
              someone elses hands, especially things like this where the
              service provider should have visibility into what they are
              or are not admitting.
>>> Agreed on your synopsis of call admission control,
              the border should be able to make these decisions rapidly,
              freeing up softswitch resources to actually serve
>>> This sounds like good territory for an acme SPL
              plugin, possibly in
>>> conjunction with this enum extension
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-source-uri-00 unfortunately i dont see a clear path for this in the TDM world but my exposure there is limited. It would seem like a good solution might be using ENUM (with source URI) to build statistics centrally based on calling/called numbers and then forcing the ENUM response once thresholds are hit to illicit an appropriate decline message for flagged invites with a retry-after interval allowing you to effectively throttle specific call scenarios assuming your origination carriers will behave correctly.
>>> 2 of the examples we discussed previously were:
>>> 1: Social media death star. Justin biebers (or anyone
              else with millions of rabid followers) twitter account 
              (53.7M followers) gets hacked and attacker tweets "Call
              this number for free tickets" or similar.
>>> 2: T-DOS using stolen sip accounts effectively
              turning other service providers into a death star. More
              damage per source number (higher CPS than social media per
              attacker but less distributed source). This one seems much
              easier to create given the ease with which stolen sip
              accounts can be acquired, and harder to mitigate if the
              stolen accounts support callerID spoofing.
>>> Both of these situations are exacerbated by LCR
              resellers creating at times 10-20 invites from 1 due to
              route advancing when the destination is truly congested,
              which gets worse when the LCR resellers in turn have
              resellers in route etc etc.
>>> Of course any solution needs to have provisions for
              conveying congestion control to the originating network so
              they stop route advancing.
>>> I think this has commercial viability for access
              providers protecting
>>> their customers business interests and for
              implementers designing
>>> solutions but perhaps not so much in a carrier to
              carrier capacity
>>> (beyond appropriate support of signaling congestion
>>> On 8/18/2014 12:48 PM, Mark R Lindsey wrote:
>>>> Ryan, does it seem as though TDoS will be most
              effectively addressed by the origination companies?  i.e.,
              the guys with the TDM trunks to the local tandems, such as
              incumbents, Verizon, Level(3).
>>>> It seems to me that some use of statistics could
              probably make reasonable guesses about whether a given
              PSTN origination call is likely to be legitimate (for a
              call from A to B). For example, I'll bet you could make a
              good start looking at numbers and geographic areas:
>>>>      -- Has telephone number A called to
              telephone number B before? Or B->A ?
>>>>      -- Has GeographicArea(A) called to telephone
              number B before? Or GeographicArea(B) -> A?
>>>> The more you know about telephone numbers A and
              B, the more you could guess about the likelihood that a
              given call is legitimate.
>>>> And getting good at this should be a competitive
              advantage, just as effective anti-spam is an advantage
              elsewhere. Vendors that build the edge gear -- in
              particular, the SBC and TDM SS7 gateway vendors -- should
              be leading the way.
>>>> And wholesale carriers could take some advantage
              and make it broadly available. For example, let's say
              Verizon came along and said, "Here's a reason to port your
              numbers from Level(3) to us: When you're under attack,
              we're going to be smart about the ways we selectively
              admit calls to your network."
>>>>>>> mark at ecg.co +1-229-316-0013 http://ecg.co/lindsey
>>>> On Aug 18, 2014, at 13:52 , Ryan Delgrosso <ryandelgrosso at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> IP DDOS and TDOS are really two different
              problems but yes we as ITSP's and CLECs living in the IP
              space are absolutely susceptible to both.
>>>>> Ive done a fair amount of research into both
              of these topics and we have seen varying cases of both,
              but usually IP DDOS steals the spotlight because the
              numbers are bigger and the effects are usually more
              widespread whereas a TDOS attack is rarely felt by anyone
              that doesn't live in the affected region or isn't actively
              trying to call the victim, and usually telcos keep these
              issues pretty close to the chest.
>>>>> I expect this sort of attack is going to
              increase in magnitude in the coming 24-36 months as
              attackers figure out how to wield it. Mark Collier gave a
              very interesting talk at one of the CFCA events on this
              topic, though the focus was on the enterprise victim, but
              the lessons are really the same. There just arent really
              any good tools to mitigate this sort of attack today,
              especially at the carrier level.
>>>>> -Ryan
>>>>> On 8/18/2014 6:30 AM, Matt Yaklin wrote:
>>>>>> It seems like almost every telephone
              company can be hit like that
>>>>>> except the ?largest?...
>>>>>> A denial of service attack by simply
              calling so many times it fills
>>>>>> up their main trunks.
>>>>>> And we saw how the large IP colo
              providers handle this for
>>>>>> customers who get dos'd. The amount of
              bandwidth they have is
>>>>>> staggering and they still cannot
              guarantee you will stay up if a
>>>>>> ?skilled? attacker wants you down. So you
              keep throwing money at it
>>>>>> until you are so well established online
              that you look at your
>>>>>> monthly bill and want to puke.
>>>>>> matt
>>>>>> On Mon, 18 Aug 2014, Frank Bulk wrote:
>>>>>>> http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/Hackers-Behind-Phone-Outage-In-
>>>>>>> Clay-County-271463051.html?ref=051
>>>>>>> Painful issue for Big River
>>>>>>> Frank
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